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I. INTRODUCTION: IP LAW AND HEALTH CARE

IP law is economic law. It restrains and prohibits unauthorized
copying. But why? The answer is built right into our Constitution: "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ." When our
Framers drafted that document, they understood "Science" as knowledge
generally, as embodied in books, and "useful Arts" as what we call
"technology" today - the subjects of copyrights and patents,
respectively.
How does IP "promote" these things? Our IP Clause answers that
question, too: "by securing to Authors and Inventors for limited Times2
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.",
When our Founders wrote "exclusive Right," they meant what we mean
today when we say "legal monopoly."
Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus, University of Akron School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
2. Id.
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Similar rationales for trade secrets and trademarks came much later,
through organic common-law development. Legal protection of trade
secrets encourages advances in technology that cannot or will not be
patented, 3 and trademarks encourage investment in convenient and
reliable brand identifiers that high-population consumer societies like
ours (which our Founders never knew) need to avoid chaos in the
marketplace. 4
Our Framers were not ignorant of how monopolies work. They did
not use modem economic terminology because much of it had not yet
been invented. And they certainly did not use quantitative methods.
.Adam Smith had just published An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations in 1776, as we were starting to fight for our
independence.
But our Framers knew all about how monopolies raise prices, stifle
commerce, and impede innovation. The lawyers among them, who were
many, knew from the old English Statute of Monopolies. 5 That
venerable statute already had prohibited monopolies, with an exception
for patents on "new Manufactures," for a century and a half.6

The

businessmen, like Ben Franklin, knew these things from practical
experience and from reading.
That is why they inserted the words "for limited Times." We do
not know for sure, but this phrase probably arose from a famous
colloquy, by letter, between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison when
Jefferson was our ambassador to France. 7 Ever the populist, Jefferson
hated monopolies because they raised prices and hurt the people. 8 He
wanted to include a prohibition against them in our Bill of Rights. 9
Madison convinced him that, as Jefferson himself later put it, "ingenuity
should receive a liberal encouragement."' 0
The result was our IP Clause with its time limitation. That
limitation curtails the bad effects of monopolies by putting the subjects
3.

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) ("Trade secret law will

encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent
innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.").
4.
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COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 1.02[5] (2014); 3 id. § 9.02[1].
5.
See Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and BusinessMethod Patents,43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 829-30 (2003) [hereinafter Darcy].

6.

Id. at 826-28.

7.

See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (for citation to,

discussion of, and quotations from this correspondence).
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id. at 7-8.
10. Id. at8.
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of copyright and patent protection in the public domain, eventually.
There they can be copied freely, so that others can use them to innovate
or make their own "riffs," after the short period of monopoly has done
its job: providing economic incentives for innovation or creativity.
Jefferson, to whom we owe our IP Clause, was smart enough to
keep two seemingly contradictory things in his mind at the same time.
He probably drafted the Clause that authorizes IP law, but he also knew
how important copying was to the progress of knowledge and
technology.
He had no idea how important copying would be in a modem
consumer society where millions of people daily enrich their lives with
identical machine-manufactured products, or (today) bits and bytes
copied automatically and identically and transmitted electronically. But
he understood the principle. In a famous passage in one of his letters,"
he described how knowledge propagates in our species by a process of
sharing from person to person, which he analogized to one candle being
lit from another. If he had thought about it, he probably would also have
mentioned the flowering of baroque music, whose composers all copied
shamelessly from each other and their own earlier works.
So our basic law and our Framers' wisdom recognize that IP law is
economic law. Where it outlaws copying, copying becomes malum
prohibitum - wrong because outlawed, for economic reasons - not
malum in se, or wrong in itself.
That is why I wince when I hear the RIAA (Recording Industry
Association of America) and its public-relations people analogizing
unauthorized downloading to stealing. We may need to outlaw it in
order to have any music industry at all, and we may need to have harsh
sanctions in order to get that point across (the jury is still out on the
latter point, often literally).
But it is not "stealing." An illegal downloader takes nothing but
hoped-for revenue from the copyright owner, and nothing at all from
other music listeners. She is like the borrower of Jefferson's "taper"
(candle), who uses it to light her own so she can grow wiser but leave
the other candle still lit brightly.' 2 We prohibit downloading for
economic reasons, nothing more.
Our Founders wrote succinctly and with a broad brush, on IP as on
everything else. They left it for future generations to flesh out the details
11. See Scott Carpenter, Thomas Jefferson on Patents and Freedom of Ideas, MOVNG TO
FREEDOM (Oct. 6, 2006), http://movingtofreedom.org/2006/10/06/thomas-jefferson-on-patents-andfreedom-of-ideas/.
12. Id.
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and make necessary adjustments from time to time. But they left no
doubt that economics - not some moral command or prohibition - is the

motivating force behind and the lodestar for IP law. We should take
these basic principles, so clearly enshrined in our Constitution, to heart
as we continue to apply IP law to rapidly changing technology in a
rapidly changing global economy.
Perhaps belatedly, the Supreme Court and Congress are starting to
do just that. They are beginning to question whether patents on
abstractions and basic research are good things' 3 in a global economy
where innovation in ideas proceeds at light speed, often over the
Internet, and where we now know that the basis of life itself is abstract
information, which we can store in electronic databases. They are
beginning to take seriously the question whether we should encourage
non-practicing "troll" corporations, 14 often set up by lawyers who know
little or nothing about engineering or science, to use stale patents to
bleed and impede innovators who do.
As we address these important questions, we must rely more and
more on economic analysis and economic studies, as "dismal" as that
science may be. We must do so not just because our Framers left clear
signals that that is what they intended. We must do so because we now
live in a fiercely competitive global economy. If we do not get our
economics right, others will get theirs right and surpass us, more quickly
than we can imagine.
So how do we apply these principles to healthcare? I propose to
address briefly two important IP questions from an economic
perspective: patented drug pricing in an international context and trade
secret protection for health care outcomes. The first will involve some
algebra; the second involves a bit of common sense that so far seems to
have eluded us.

13.

For a nine-page mathematical demonstration why this is generally not a good thing, see

Jay Dratler, Jr.,

Combinatorial Mathematics and the Problem of Early-Stage Patents in

Biotechnology (Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-02,
2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-i-id=959462 [hereinafter
Combinatorial].
14. The operative word here is "beginning." After years of effort, and with apparent
prospects for success, an anti-troll bill failed in Senate maneuvering due to opposition from "big
pharma," some universities, and other risk-averse stakeholders that prefer the status quo. See Dan
D'Ambrosio, Patent reform fight ends in retreat -for

now, USA TODAY (July 9, 2014, 11:14

http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/08/patent-troll-legislationAM),
fight/12392453/.
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II. PRICING PATENTED NEW DRUGS GLOBALLY

A. The Basics
Everyone who studies IP, including those like me' 5 who have
become skeptical of ever-broadening patentable subject matter, knows
that patents are a sine qua non of pharmaceutical innovation. They are
essential for a simple 6and compelling reason: developing new drugs is
extremely expensive.'
Not only do drug innovators have to create something new, safe,
and effective, they also have to prove it is safe and effective in largescale clinical trials that are among the most complex, tricky, and
expensive things that any industry does. If copiers could take the results
of this long, risky, and expensive process and copy the pills, incurring
only manufacturing and distribution costs, they would drive innovators
out of business and investors in drug innovation away. Then we would
not have any pharmaceutical research or innovation at all. So the
pharmaceutical sector is the paradigm of a patent-driven industry.
But that is just the beginning of the analysis. The pharmaceutical
industry is also a matter of life and death, or at least longevity and
quality of life, for millions of patients with various diseases and
conditions. The more widely we can distribute safe and effective new
drugs, and the cheaper we can make each pill, the more lives we can
save and the more patients we can benefit.
This is a classic case of "tension" between fundamental values:
innovation and its human benefits, which would not be possible without
the innovation.
As we now know, when values are in tension, the best approach is
not to pick one or the other as the one you like best. The best approach
is to dig deeper and see if you can discern in more detail how the tension
between values actually works in practice. Then you may discover
where and how to adjust the system, and whether and when you need to
compromise the two values, in order to produce optimal benefit, or at
least minimally acceptable results.
15. See generally Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 47, 56-57 (2010); Combinatorial,supra note 13; Jay Dratler, Jr., Invention is a
Process, or Why the Electronics and PharmaceuticalIndustries are at Loggerheads over Patents
(Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-13, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=899924 [hereinafter Process]; Jay
Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299 (2005);
Darcy, supra note 5.
16. For my own recognition of these points, see Process,supra note 15, at 1-2 & n.3, 17-19.
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In the case of new pharmaceuticals, that digging requires a little
math and an arithmetic table. But that is a good way to see the
relationships between the key economic variables that drive
pharmaceutical innovation.
B. The Variables
In abstract principle, it is easy to see what factors help patents drive
innovation in pharmaceuticals and effect patient benefits. Patents are
vital because innovation is so expensive. So the key variable for
justifying patent protection is development cost, including the cost of
clinical trials.
A Tufts University study about a decade ago put this cost at $ 0.8
billion per new drug. 17 The study is a bit outdated, and the cost has
probably risen. Since $1 billion is a nice round number and we are
interested primarily in rough quantitative trends, not detailed economics
or business analysis, we will use it.
Another study estimates that, for every five developmental new
drugs that make it to clinical trials, only one succeeds.' 8 It is not clear
whether this point refers to large-scale clinical trials, which are by far
the most expensive stage of drug development. So as a rough educated
guess, assume a total development cost, including begun but failed
development projects, of $ 2.5 billion for each new drug. For abstract
use in formulas, designate this cost as "D," the development cost.
That is a lot of money. In order to invest it, investors must expect
not just to recover the development cost, but to get what economists call
a "risk premium" as well. To put it another way, if investors did not get
more than their development cost back, they would earn nothing and
would not make the investment in the first place.
In modern business terms, what they require is a positive annual
"rate of return" on their investment, which we will designate by the
letter "R." It is often expressed as a percentage, but in calculations the
corresponding decimal fraction is used. (You can think of R as an

17. Press Release, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Tufts Univ., Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million (Nov. 30,
2001), (on file with author).
18. See Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy and Availability: Patents and
New Product Development in the Pharmaceuticaland Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL'Y

REV. 7, 9 (2003) (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical Testing
in the United States, 58 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 1-14 (1995) ("[o]nly 20

percent of the compounds entering clinical trials survive the development process and gain FDA
approval")).
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interest rate that a bank would pay if it paid as well as a risky investment
in new drugs. It fixes what the development money would return if
invested in such a bank account, drawing interest at the rate of return for
twenty years - the patent term - compounded annually.) For the
moment, keep R abstract, a dependent variable.
The independent variables are easier to identify.
The drug
company must incur the cost of manufacturing and distributing the pills,
which we will lump together into a single independent cost variable,
"C." For ease of handling, we will consider this cost to be the perpatient annual cost of treatment, so we do not have to keep track of
dosage, the number of pills used per year, or their individual cost.
Finally, we have a very important independent variable: the number
of patients, "N," who need the drug. Pharmaceuticals are unique
products in one respect: medicine, not marketing, largely determines
their market size, because only patients who have a particular disease or
condition and are likely to benefit will buy the drug. Marketing and
customer preferences, which are important for other types of products,
are negligible in comparison. (Some people will not endure the side
effects or will not take the pills for religious, personal or other reasons,
but we can ignore them for now.)
The two dependent variables are the rate of return, R, and the perpatient price in dollars, "P," of a yearly course of treatment. We want to
see how their relationship varies depending on the size of the market, N,
and the per-patient manufacturing and distribution cost for an annual
course of treatment, C.
The patent term is twenty years, and we assume the drug maker is
clever enough to begin making and selling the new pills just as it starts.
That assumption is unrealistic, but not wildly so.
Anyway, it
disadvantages the investors, but it compensates for the fact that we are
not going to consider the impact of post-patent-expiration sales of the
generic drug, which advantage them. (We do not know that these two
effects actually cancel each other, but at least they cut in opposite
directions.)
C. The Formula
With this introduction and explanation, we can now derive a simple
formula for pharmaceutical investment. Over the twenty-year period of
patent protection, the revenue coming back to the pharmaceutical
company is as follows:

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
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Patent term revenue = 20*N*(P-C) [Equation 1]
That is, the pharmaceutical innovator's revenue from selling the new
drug over the patent's term is twenty times the number of patients
needing it, times the difference between the annual price charged for the
drug and the annual cost of its manufacture and distribution. (This
analysis neglects likely changes in those variables over the course of the
patent's term; but, again, we are looking for general quantitative trends,
not precision in any particular case.)
Money is neither created nor destroyed, except by bankers. So the
revenue or money coming in must equal the money going back to
investors, or the investors' development cost, D, inflated exponentially
by their annual rate of return, R. Thus,
D*(l + R)**20 = 20*N*(P-C) [Equation 2]
(For ease in typography and format-free electronic transmission, we use
computer programming symbology, in which * denotes multiplication
and * * denotes an exponent, here taking (I +R) to the twentieth power.)
This formula shows how the investors' rate of return, R, depends on
the price charged for the new drug, P (for an annual course of treatment),
the annual cost of making and distributing it, C, the size of the patient
market, N, and the cost of development D, which we assume to be $2.5
billion.
This formula is general but not entirely accurate. It neglects the
effect of economic price inflation on both sides of the equation. That is
not too bad for R, for you can think of R as an inflation-adjusted rate of
return, i.e., a rate of return reduced by the rate of inflation. It does
neglect the effect of inflation on the cost C, plus the fact that the seller
might increase the price to compensate for cost inflation. But the
formula is still not too bad, as P will usually be quite a bit larger than C
in order to recoup the huge development expense, let alone at a decent
rate of return.
D. Some Results
If as a math-hating law professor you have not fallen asleep yet,
you are now in for a treat. We can get to the fun part: the results.
We are not going to do much with the manufacturing-anddistribution cost, C, so let us assume a constant $100 for all our results.
That is $100/365 = 27 cents a day, or per pill if patients take one pill a

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol7/iss1/1

8

Dratler: IP and Health Care
2014]

IP AND HEALTH CARE

day. That is high today, but it may be more realistic as we get more into
"personalized medicine" with differing, personalized formulations
designed for each patient's genome. Now our formula becomes:
$2.5 billion * (l+R)**20 = 20*N*(P-$ 100) [Equation 3]
You cannot tell much just by looking at this formula, so we will study a
table of results.
Table 1 shows how the annual per-patient price of treatment P (in
dollars, rounded to the nearest whole dollar) varies with the market size
N and the rate of return R. Our minimum R, 5%, is about the lowest any
investor in pharmaceutical innovation would accept today. Riskless
Treasury bills for twenty-year terms, if they existed, would now pay
around 2% to 2.5%, so the "risk premium" for our huge twenty-year
investment would be only 2.5% to 3%. That is small. (We have also
tried to account for the risk of development failure by inflating the
successful single-drug development cost D 2.5 times to account for
failed projects. But there is always more risk in estimating risk, and
savvy investors would demand compensation for it.)
Table 1: Annual Treatment Price as Function of Rate of Return and
No. of Patients
Annual

N=500,000

N=1 million

N=5 million

N=10 million

N=50 million

5%

$763

$432

$166

$133

$107

10%

$1,782

$941

$268

$184

$117

25%

$21,784

$10,942

$2,268

$1,184

$317

50%

$831,414

$415,757

$83,231

$41,666

$8,413

Rate of
Return

Two things are apparent from the table. First, the treatment price
depends dramatically on the market size: the larger the market, the
cheaper the pills. As you get to markets of fifty million patients, the cost
of treatment comes close to the cost of manufacture and distribution,
which we assume to be $100. It even comes close to cost for a relatively
high rate of return of 25% - a rate that investors in today's flat market
would kill for (as long as the risk of no return is properly accounted for).
On the other hand, as the number of patients N gets low, especially
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as low as 500,000, the cost of treatment soars, even for low rates of
return. That is why, among other things, we have special legislation on
"orphan" drugs, providing beyond-patent exclusivity to induce their
development and sale.' 9
In a free-market system, that is not a matter of corporate greed, but
simple business economics.
The only realistic alternatives are a
government subsidy of research on orphan drugs, financed by taxes, 20 or
development financed by private philanthropy.
The second thing evident from Table 1 is how the annual price of
treatment depends even more dramatically on the rate of return on
investment. That is due to the exponential rise in total dollar return with
rate of return. As the rate of return goes up, the incentive to invest goes
up, but so does the treatment price, dramatically.
If patients must pay for pills themselves, some get priced out of the
market and suffer or die. If insurance pays, the patients get saved, but
premiums go up and everyone pays more.
Our Supreme Court has rightly recognized that patent (or
copyright) protection confers only a legal monopoly, not an economic
monopoly. 2 1 But new drugs differ from other patented products. If (as
is often the case) they are the only effective way to treat a particular
disease, the patent confers an economic as well as legal monopoly, for
patients have to buy from a single source (the lone pharmaceutical
innovator) or suffer or die. That is pretty strong market or monopoly
power.
Coupled with Table 1, these facts put the policy question in stark
relief. Should government intervene and limit or control the maximum
rate of return that investors can get, and thereby limit new-drug prices?
In a free-market system, the traditional answer is, "no, let the
market decide." But with new drugs, moral considerations inevitably
intrude. If patients pay themselves, some will suffer or die if the price is
too high. If insurance pays, everyone will pay more.
Market economics cannot answer these questions because there is
no right or ability to "take it or leave it," as with ordinary commodities.
If we (or they) want to save patients, we have to take it. So for a
19. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in
relevant part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2012)).
20. The Orphan Drug Act permits such grants but does not require or appropriate funds for
them. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(a).
21. See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-46 (2006) ("[A] patent
does not necessarily confer market power [upon the patentee] ... and therefore [we] hold that, in all
cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in
the tying product.").
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uniquely effective new drug, the new-drug patent monopoly gives
investors the power to raise prices as high as their pocketbooks demand
and their consciences allow. (The law of supply and demand imposes
some limitations, discussed below, but only after some patients cannot
afford the new drug and so suffer or die.)
In a paper this short, there are only two observations worth making.
First, these issues are essentially issues of public policy, outside the
traditional sphere of IP. Lawyers cannot solve them just by applying the
law.
Second, and even more important, economics is also of no help
here. There is no way for economics to decree a "right" rate of return,
any more than the law can determine a "just price." The market is
supposed to fix those things, but, as we should know by now, the market
is amoral and lacks human values.
There are lots of scientific, medical, chemical, engineering, and
manufacturing risks in new-drug development and production that this
simple model cannot take into account. The higher those risks, the
higher the rate of return rational investors will demand, and the higher
the drug price will be. And we know of no way, at present, of
estimating, let alone quantifying, what fraction of their demand comes
from reasonable risk assessment and what fraction comes from sheer
greed.
At the margins, where risks and prices get high and people start to
die, the only known solutions are: (1) private philanthropy, (2)
government subsidy, (3) or government price controls, which inject
politics into economics and, if too crude, risk killing the research goose
that lays the golden eggs of new drugs.
This analysis shows why we will not ever have relief from
interminable political squabbles about drug prices, unless our plutocrats
get so rich that their philanthropy can pick up the entire tab - an unlikely
prospect. With our guesstimated $2.5 billion development cost, D, even
Bill Gates' or Warren Buffet's $30 billion dollar gift would support only
a dozen new drugs.
As genomics and personalized medicine advance, science is likely
to make hundreds of new drugs possible and useful in the next two
decades. Someone will have to decide which ones get developed and
which do not. If policymakers do not decide, private investors will.
Private philanthropy, while helpful, simply cannot fill the gap. As these
formulas and tables show, the two most important determinants of
pricing will be the number of patients who need a new drug and their
ability to pay, as perceived by investors.
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The most basic law of economics is "there is no such thing as a free
lunch."
Someone has to pay the enormous costs of new drug
development, which will only get higher as advances in medicine and
medical technology bring with them enormous demand for personalized
drugs. And someone has to decide where to put the money we can spare.
If we do not develop rules, or at least guidelines, for deciding rationally,
powerful people's personal preferences - or what conditions their kids
have - will determine haphazardly which of us will suffer or die
although modem medicine could, in theory, save us.
E. Internationalmarkets.
This brings us to the cause c~lkbre of the last few years:
international markets in new pharmaceuticals. Sixteen years after the
TRIPS Agreement's adoption, all the transition periods have passed.22
Now every country - whether least developed, developing, or developed
- is supposed to have patent protection for pharmaceuticals, both
products and processes. 23
Almost all do, and "big pharma" has the money and the incentive to
file for patents in every market it deems important. In every such
market, the TRIPS Agreement obligates the relevant jurisdiction to
recognize and enforce patent protection, unless a few rarely-used
exceptions for public order and public health apply. 24
In this context, the possibilities for investors in new drugs to
recover their investment with an attractive rate of return are nearly
endless. They can pick and choose from 160 different markets in which
to manufacture and distribute,2 5 or to license manufacture and
distribution of their new drug. In some of those markets, they may have
to leap new regulatory hurdles for the drug itself or (more likely) its
local manufacture. These hurdles impose new development costs, while
each market creates a new source of revenue.
Our simple formula in Equation 2 obviously will not suffice for the
general case. But we can expand it with a few restrictive but often
realistic assumptions.
22. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 65, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
23. Id. at art. 27(1).
24. Id. at art. 27(2). For enforcement procedures, see id. at art. 41-61.
25. As of July 24, 2014, the TRIPS Agreement had 160 signatory nations. Understanding
the

WTO:

The

Organization,

WORLD

TRADE

ORG.,

http://wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited July 24, 2014).
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Suppose that a single entity, the drug developer, owns the patents
and all the manufacturing and distribution facilities in countries 1 though
M, including the home country of original development. And suppose
the regulatory costs outside the home country are negligible in amount
compared to the regulatory costs at home. Since the TRIPS Agreement
demands uniform patent terms of twenty years,2 6 our formula becomes:
D*(I+R)**20 = 20 *Y [Ni*(Pi-Ci)], [Equation 4]
where the "Y" term is the sum from i = 1 to M of the revenue from the
various countries, namely, 20*Nj*(Pi-Ci), assuming the patient market,
price and cost will differ in each. (For typographical reasons, I do not
show the range limits for the variable "i" in the usual places, at the
bottom and top of the capital sigma.)
As this formula suggests, the international context multiplies both
the humanitarian opportunities and the policy choices. Suppose, for
example, that the home country, i = 1, has a rich enough and big enough
patient population to support drug prices there that provide an ample rate
of return, "Rl," by themselves. Then:
D*(I+R 1 )**20 = 20*Nl*(Pj-Cj) [Equation 5]
In that case, the other nations, 2 though M, need not add anything to the
investors' return, thus:
For i = 2 through M, 20*Ni*(Pi-Ci) = 0, or Pi = Ci [Equation 6]
That is, our hypothetical single entity could then sell the new pills in
every country in which it does business outside the home country at cost,
i.e., at a price no higher than the manufacturing and distribution cost in
that country. In our example we assumed that to be 27 cents per day for
the home country, but in less-developed countries it might well be less.
This strategy could save millions of lives around the world and still give
the single entity's investors a satisfactory rate of return.
But of course life is seldom so simple. No home country is so rich
that all patients who need a drug can afford it. If insurance pays,
everyone pays. So our strategy that seems so simple from the investors'
viewpoint would probably generate lots of pushback from patients and
insurers in the home country.

26.

TRIPS Agreement, supranote 22, at art. 33.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014

13

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 7 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

There are other options the single entity and/or its investors could
take. They could charge higher prices in other countries and enjoy a
higher rate of return on their investment. They could raise prices in the
home country, sell the pills below cost in other countries and still make a
reasonable rate of return. They could sell the pills at the same price in
all countries, pricing many patients out of the market in many countries,
and make a huge rate of return. (We assume here that the home country
is highly developed and relatively rich and the other countries more
populous and relatively poorer. For example, think of a two-country
model with the United States as the home country and India as the chief
foreign market.)
Nothing in market economics can decide among these models. In a
free market system, investors decide based on their pocketbooks,
consciences, and business resources, and patients influence their
decisions through collective action (remember the street marches by and
for AIDS sufferers?), economic pressure, and political pressure.
In administrative systems, administrators might make or influence
the decisions. But the TRIPS Agreement gives them little legal leeway
to deviate from free-market principles. And if they are smart, they will
not stray too far from good economic principles anyway because doing
so would discourage operations inside their borders. (If one country
offers a higher local rate of return on investment than another, guess
where investors and their hired factories and expertise will go.)
So again we have a set of moral and public-policy questions. They
are really outside the purview of IP law, although their parameters and
limits depend on it. In a global free-market system, now with
enforceable IP law under the TRIPS Agreement, investors who fund
pharmaceutical innovation are free to charge what the market will bear,
to gouge some markets and coddle others, and to make as big a rate of
return as their greed demands and consciences allow.
The only economic limit on investors' rate of return is the law of
supply and demand. As the rate of return increases, so does the price of
treatment. As it rises, it may force some patients and/or insurers from
the market. At some point, the increasing price per pill and decreasing
N may cause total revenue to drop, thereby also dropping the rate of
return. But because we are talking about life-saving pills, not jelly
beans, social and political pushback will probably come long before that
point.
To my knowledge, there is no framework of international law, or
even custom, that comes close to resolving these issues. There are only
the few exceptions in international conventions, including the Paris
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Convention 27 and the TRIPS Agreement, 28 for public order and public
health. And they are seldom used, simply because it is one thing to
decree a patent forfeiture or commandeered license and quite another to
find a competent firm that will manufacture and distribute a
commandeered drug safely and effectively and at a price set by politics.
In an ideal world, there would be some international consensus on
international manufacture and sale of important new drugs, providing
guidelines that maximize both returns for investors and relief for
patients. The international effort to distribute retroviral drugs to slow
the HIV epidemic in Africa might be a model, or at least a starting point,
for such guidelines. Economics can be helpful in showing the various
stakeholders what the effects of different models might be, but it cannot
resolve the moral, ethical, and public-policy questions. Nor can IP law.
Only bargaining through a political process can do that.
III. KEEPING MEDICAL OUTCOMES SECRET
Another point of intersection between IP law and health care is a
case study in the transition from common law to statutes. That is the
increasing use of trade secret law to keep medical outcomes and records
of success or failure secret.
Take a simple example. Suppose a leading health-care provider has9
2
a poor record of success with a particular standard surgical procedure.
Its rates of mortality and morbidity are above average, and it has a far
higher than average rate of nosocomial (hospital-acquired) infection.
Accrediting organizations like JCAHO 30 have access to this
information by virtue of their accrediting power. If they do not get it,
they will not accredit the provider, with obvious adverse effects.
But what about the public? What about admitting doctors, patients
and prospective patients? What about other providers? What about
newly-minted doctors in the field who are deciding where to practice?
27. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A(2)-(5), 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 (as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference July 14, 1967).
28. TRIPS Agreement, supranote 22.
29. The observations that follow do not apply to innovative procedures and experiments.
Publishing their results prematurely might inhibit innovation by drying up research funds or
producing inappropriate political or professional pressure. The type of "procedure" I have in mind
here is a routine surgical operation covered by widely available best practices guidelines. There are
many such in medicine today.
30. JCAHO, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, is a
nonprofit corporation that reviews and accredits health-care providers. See Definition of JCAHO in
the

Medical

Dictionary

-

JCAHO,

THE

FREE

DICTIONARY,

http://medical-

dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/JCAHO (last visited July 24, 2014).
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Can they get this information?
Today, the answer is often no. One reason given is that these data
"trade
secrets" of the hospital, medical group or even doctor in
are
question. But does this reason make sense?
If you look only at the wording of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
which nearly all 50 states have adopted - 47, to be exact 3 1 you can
make a good argument that it does. The definition of "trade secret,"
which I quote verbatim in the footnotes, has three elements: (1) relative
secrecy, (2) economic value by virtue of secrecy, and (3) reasonable
efforts to keep the secret. 32
Any health-care provider with the poor records assumed would
probably satisfy this statutory definition, literally interpreted. To
preserve its reputation and avoid bad publicity, it probably keeps the bad
data relatively secret, or, as the statute says, not "generally known" and
not "readily ascertainable." If it did not, it would lose patients and
doctors and probably not be doing that procedure much longer. For the
same reason, it probably devotes more than reasonable efforts to keep
the secret. Thus it probably satisfies prongs (1) and (3) of the definition
of "trade secret."
But is the poor performance record really a trade secret? From a
statutory perspective, the bodies are buried (literally!) in the second
requirement: economic value by virtue of secrecy.
Again, a literal interpretation of the words alone seems to fit. If the
secret gets out, the provider and alleged trade secret owner will suffer
economically. For the provider, it is better off if the secret stays secret.
Competing providers would benefit by getting the information and
making it public, because terrified patients would come to them. So at
first glance the secret has competitive value, too - the touchstone of
prong (2).
But does that mean the secret has the kind of "value" that trade
secret law recognizes? To the provider trying to keep it, it has value
only in a negative sense. It is well known that negative results in science
or engineering - the fact that an experiment or line of inquiry did not

31. See 2 DRATLER & MCJOHN, supra note 4, § 4.01[3][b] (table of adopting jurisdictions,
with citations).
32. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985) ('Trade secret' means information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.").
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work - can be a trade secret. 33 But is this the same sort of negative
information?
I think not. The negative result of an experiment can be a trade
secret because experiments cost money. The alleged trade secret
owner's investment in the experiment has "economic value" because it
provides knowledge of something that cost money to discover, and
because he can now pursue alternative lines of inquiry, or drop the
whole line of research without wasting more.
While keeping the secret from competitors might encourage them
to invest in duplicative and useless experiments, allowing them to steal
the secret with impunity would let them reap where they have not sown.
Doing that would discourage everyone, at the margins, from investing in
high-risk experiments, i.e., those with a high probability of a negative
outcome. It would thus discourage research that ultimately leads to
innovation after a few false starts.
The purpose of protecting trade secrets is much the same as for
patents. Protection encourages investment in innovation and 34prevents
what economists call free-riding on someone else's investment.
But that is not what protecting our hypothetical bad-performance
secrets does. Poor medical performance of the type we are discussing is
not the result of investment in innovation. Often it derives from afailure
to innovate or a simple failure to follow standard procedures, such as
having doctors wash their hands.
And protecting the secret encourages precisely the wrong behavior:
sloppy and substandard health care. In this case releasing the secret
would have a better result: encouraging poorly performing providers and
doctors to clean up their act (through loss of custom and public pressure,
if nothing else), and giving patients and admitting doctors an incentive to
seek better results elsewhere until they do. Cessante ratione legis,
cessat et ipsa lex.
If trade secret law were still common law, as it was in the
beginning, 35 no competent judge would entertain this claim for long.
But something - including judicial flexibility - was lost in the
translation from common law to statute. The rigidity of the statutory
language at issue permits credible arguments that mistakes can be hidden
33. See 2 DRATLER & MCJOHN, supranote 4, § 4.02[2][b].
34. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) ("Trade secret law will
encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent
innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.").
35. See Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1889) (paradigmatic common law, trade secret
case).
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behind a veil of legal secrecy. Closer examination suggests an obvious
truth: that trade secret law, like IP law generally, is there to encourage
innovation, not hide mistakes.
That is why, among other things, we will always have and need
human judges and at least a residue of the old common law. The
ambiguity and other limitations of human tongues preclude statutory
drafters, no matter how provident or clever, from ruling out in advance
all the specious arguments that lawyers may later make based on
statutory language once set in print. Only judges can make sure the
process of putting policy principles into words does not transgress
common sense.
IV. CONCLUSION

This short paper deals with two very different issues. The first is
how to spread the benefits of exorbitantly expensive pharmaceutical
research in a globalized economy based on free-market principles and IP
law. The second is whether doctors can hide their mistakes and poor
performance behind the IP law of trade secrets.
As unlike as they first appear, the two issues have some things in
common. Both address the unintended consequences of laws that, in the
abstract, are good and well founded. Both reflect the fundamental nature
of IP law as economic law, and the crying need for economic and
competitive analysis.
And both suggest that the law alone is not enough. In order to
reach the law's abstract and theoretical objectives in practice, courts and
policy makers must focus on how it actually works in the real world. In
many cases - certainly in getting new drugs to patients who need them that means knowing something about economics and how it impacts
patient care. In some cases - as in refusing to let doctors keep their
mistakes secret - it means not losing sight of common sense.
Old common-law judges used to do the latter pretty well, but they
were often unversed in economics. Now judges and policy-makers have
to do both - tasks that the density and rigidity of detailed statutory
language often make difficult. If Congress (with its own economic staff
and hired experts) cannot or will not do the job, perhaps it should
appropriate
money for judges to hire economic experts beholden only to
6
them.

3

36. See FED. R. EVID. 706. This rule allows courts to appoint their own experts, as European
courts often do. Our own courts do not lack the authority, just the money.
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